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Since 2003, the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme, a community-based health insurance, is 
gradually implemented in China, in order to increase the access of the poor to healthcare services, 
reduce out-of-pocket expenditures and avoid catastrophic health expenditures. The paper estimates 
the impact of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme on a sample of 24 randomly selected 
township hospitals of Weifang prefecture (Shandong province, China), using a generalized form of 
differences-in-differences  model  on  longitudinal  data  over  the  period  2000-2008.  Estimations 
highlight three main results. First, the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme has a positive impact 
on  the  utilization  of  township  hospitals,  mainly  on  inpatient  services,  but  none  effect  on  their 
financial structure. In addition, the positive impact on the volume of discharged patients is higher in 
poor areas rather than the non-poor, reflecting a decrease of the burden of hospitalization costs. 
Lastly, the marginal impact of the reform is decreasing over time. 
 
JEL Classification: G22, I1, I38, O12.  
 






This paper is part of a research program in collaboration with the Medical Weifang University. It has 
been  supported  by  the  Embassy  of  France  in  China  and  by  the  University  of  Auvergne.  It  has 
benefited from comments and suggestions from, Jenny Aker (TUFTS University, USA), Jean-Claude 
Berthélemy  (Paris  1  University,  France),  Mead  Over  (CGDev,  USA),  Elisabeth  Sadoulet  (Berkeley, 
USA), David Sahn (Cornell University, USA), from participants the IEA 16
th World Congress (Beijing, 
China), and from colleagues from the CERDI.  
 
 




Since the beginning of the 21
st century, China has been committed to vast social reforms, particularly addressed 
to the rural population. In 2003, this engagement was expressed by the introduction of the New Rural Health 
Insurance System (NRCMS) designed to alleviate financial barriers to the access to healthcare, particularly to 
expensive healthcare services leading to impoverishment. During the Tenth National People’s Congress on 2007, 
March, the Prime Minister Wen Jiabao confirmed the strong commitment of the Chinese Government to enforce 
the development of health insurance schemes in rural areas
1. In 2007, the government injected more than 32 
billion RMB (about five billion dollars) to subsidize the NRCMS reform, accounting for 44% of the government 
spending for rural health (China Health Economics Institute 2008).  
The NRCMS is based on a voluntary engagement of households and a tri-partite financing involving local 
and central governments subsidies and premium from households, and managed at county level. The overall 
contribution increases over the time, from 30 RMB per person per year in 2003 to 100 RMB per person per year 
in 2008 (Dong 2009; You and Kobayashi 2009).                                                                                                                                     
Chinese researches on the performance of the NRCMS gives highlighting field observations (Gao et al. 
2011; Li 2010; Liu 2009; Tao 2009). One of common ones concerns the quality of medical services at grass-root 
level health facilities which is poor at the moment of the reform and could impede the NRCMS performance as it 
induces  bypassing  phenomena  and  discourages  insurance  enrollment  (Gao  et  al.  2011;  Tao  2009).  The 
international literature concentrated mainly on estimating the effect of the NRCMS on both demand- and supply-
side (Barbiaz et al. 2010; Lei and Lin 2009; Sun et al. 2009; Wagstaff et al. 2009a; Yip and Hsiao 2009), or on 
analyzing enrollment and satisfaction determinants of individuals as regard to the NRCMS (Liu et al. 2008; 
Wagstaff et al. 2009b; Wang et al. 2006; Wang et al. 2008). On the demand side, researches underlined an 
increase utilization of healthcare services at all health facility levels (village health stations, Barbiaz et al. 2010); 
township hospitals (THs) and county  hospitals levels (Wagstaff et al. 2009a). But, effects on out-of-pocket 
expenditures were not homogeneous. The NRCMS seemed to have a limited effect on overall out-of-pocket 
expenditures (Sun et al. 2009; Wagstaff et al. 2009a; Dib et al. 2008), and mitigated effects considering out-of-
pocket expenditures for some kinds of services (Wagstaff et al. 2009a; Yip and Hsiao 2009), at village health 
stations level (Barbiaz et al., 2010) or according to the county considered (Wagstaff et al. 2009a). On the supply 
                                                            
1 For more details about the evolution of the health care system in China, please see: Eggleston et al. 2008; 
Hillier and Shen 1996; Hsiao 1984; Hsiao 1995; Liu et al. 1996; Liu et al. 2003; Wagstaff et al. 2009b; World 
Bank 1997; Yip and Hsiao 2008. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.37 
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side, studies found that overall the volume of medical services delivered by health facilities increased with the 
NRCMS implementation (Barbiaz et al. 2010; Wagstaff et al. 2009a). Nevertheless, effects are not homogeneous 
as regard to the health facilities and the medical services considered: the NRCMS seems to positively affect the 
volume of outpatient visits at village health stations (Barbiaz et al. 2010) and county hospitals level (Wagstaff et 
al. 2009a), but the effect is less clear at THs level (Wagstaff et al. 2009a).  The NRCMS seems also to have a 
positive effect on the income of village health stations (Barbiaz et al. 2010) and THs (Wagstaff et al. 2009a), but 
doesn’t affect the structure of the income (Barbiaz et al. 2010). 
Considering  the  multiple  configurations  in  the  implementation  of  the  NRCMS  (Brown  et  al.  2008), 
conducted by local authorities, and the differences existing across regions in China (Feng and Song 2009), case 
studies are necessary to assess the singular effects of the NRCMS in a given context in order to improve our 
knowledge about the effects of their implementation. You and Kobayashi (2009) mentioned the importance of 
taking into account of regional heterogeneity when we interpret findings under a more general context and 
Eggleston et al. (2008) highlighted the needs of micro-level data to enrich the analysis of health service delivery 
in China.  
Our study is focused on the evaluation of the impact of the NRCMS on the activities and financial structure 
of a sample of THs, located in the prefecture of Weifang (Shandong Province). One major objective of the 
implementation and scaling up of NRCMS was to increase the utilization of THs. With the increase of the 
activity, it should be expected that the financial structure of TH income, mainly dominated by the sales of 
medicines, evolves by increasing the share of medical revenue in total income. It is well known that hospitals 
tend to over-prescribe drugs (Hu et al. 2008; Liu and Mills 1999).  
 Such a study can provide policy oriented findings. The choice of the TH level is relevant in that field as 
they are specifically one of the targets of the NRCMS. In Weifang, the NRCMS is “hospitalization-oriented” 
(Dong 2009) and THs constitute the first hospitalization level for the rural population. 
The article is organized in the following way. Section 2 deals with a presentation of the set-up of the reform 
in Weifang and the functioning of the NRCMS. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology. The results are 
in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to discussion and conclusions. 
  





Weifang is a city-prefecture of Shandong province.  It is composed of 16 county-level administrative divisions. 
These counties have jurisdiction over 148 townships and 9,285 villages. The total population is 8.5 million, in 
which 6.22 million are rural, accounting for 73% of the population. In terms of health infrastructures, there are 
6,384 health facilities, including 61 county-or-above-level hospitals and 185 THs. 
The reform proceeds in a gradual way in rural areas since 2003. At the initial stage, the Weifang authorities 
have chosen some pilots counties, each of which selecting in his turn a number of townships to apply the reform. 
In  the  following  years,  new  counties  and  townships  were  involved  into  the  reform.  Until  2006,  all  the 
municipalities  and  counties  in  Weifang  are  eligible  to  the  insurance  reform  and  in  2010,  99% of  the  rural 
households get involved into the NRCMS. 
More than two third of the NRCMS funds come from local and central government subsidies. The insurance 
fund is managed by the bureau of NRCMS at Weifang prefecture. About one third of total funds is allocated to 
reimburse the expenditure of outpatient service and two third to hospitalization. 
As the central government's subsidies are granted according to the number of participants, local governments 
are  incited  to  increase  insurance  enrollments.  Several  measures  are  adopted  in  Weifang  to  incite  NCRMS 
members to attend facilities if medically needed participation. For example, an annual free health check up is 
organized for the insured that have not used the insurance during the covered year. An office of the NRCMS is 
set inside of the TH to facilitate the reimbursement on the spot. Before 2008, the insured need to seek the 
medical consultation at designated hospitals. However, great discrepancy in the quality of services offered by 
designated and non designated hospitals in some townships makes households bypass the former to visit county 
hospitals at the expense of giving up insurance reimbursement. As a consequence, they are reluctant to continue 
subscribe due to low benefits from the insurance (same observation in Wagstaff et al. 2009b). Since 2008, the 
rule of designated hospitals is released in Weifang. The patient can choose any hospital inside of the county and 
get the reimbursement, leading to some kind of competition among hospitals. 
 
   
                                                            
2  Most  of  the  information  listed  in  this  section  comes  from  personal  communication  from  Weifang  Health 
Bureau. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.37 
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Data and Methodology 
Data 
The original dataset covers 24 randomly selected THs in Weifang prefecture (about 14% of total THs in Weifang 
prefecture) observed over the period 2000-2008. It was built from a survey conducted during the third quarter of 
2009 in collaboration with University X (for reasons of anonymity, the name will be given later) and Chinese 
authorities. Information was collected from the Weifang Health Bureau database and from the registers / books 
of each TH, and was checked and completed with interviews. Data concern the characteristics of the county and 
township administrative divisions, that of the THs as well as their medical activities and financing.   
The NRCMS is gradually implemented from 2003 to 2006 in the townships where the surveyed THs are 
located. Figure 1 shows the phasing-in of the reform in our sample. In 2006, the sample is entirely covered by 
the NRCMS and from 2007, more than 90% of the population is insured with the NRCMS. 
 
FIGURE 1 Phasing-in of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on THs’ environmental characteristics and THs’ characteristics. The 
first set of variables shows THs are located in areas where the population is mainly rural (92% of the population 
on average over the period). The number of households and the rural net income per capita increase over the 
period  and  the  average  heterogeneity  between  THs  is  not  very  large.  The  descriptive  statistics  on  THs’ 
characteristics underline an increase of the size of the THs in terms of bed capacity and medical staff members 
over the period. In contrast, the volume of medical activity and the bed occupancy rate evolve in two phases: a 
decrease before the introduction of the NRCMS and an increase from 2003. The volume of discharged patients 
and the bed occupancy rate increase particularly during the phasing-in period on the reform (2003-2006) while 
the volume of outpatients increase mainly between 2006-2008, years where the reform is implemented in all our 
sample. Alongside the changes in the medical activity, financial variables
3 of THs follow the same trends: the 
business income, the medical treatment income and the income from drug sales decrease until 2003 and then 
increase. Over the period, the business income of THs consists mainly of income from drug sales rather than 
income from medical activity. 
                                                            
3 All monetary variables are in 10,000 RMB and normalized to 2000 constant prices (Shandong province price 







The implementation of the NRCMS concerned all the townships where the THs of the sample are located, but at 
a different time. The generalization of the double-difference method is used to exploit the longitudinal dataset 
and the gradual implementation of the NRCMS over time in a context where the reform wasn’t implemented in a 
random experimental way with a clear identification of comparison and treatment groups. In such case, THs not 
yet covered by the reform are considered as a comparison group for THs covered by the NRCMS. The within 
estimator is used. As there is only one TH per township in our sample, we use “i” to represent either TH or 
township. Let Yit be the outcomes variables for TH i at time t, and Pit be a dummy variable equals to one if in 
year t the township i is covered by the NRCMS, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of Pit, δ, is the parameter of 
interest. It represents the estimated average effect of the NRCMS implementation on hospital outcomes. The 
basic model to be estimated is the following: 
ln	 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ δ￿￿￿ ￿	￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  (1) 
Where ui and vt are the THs fixed-effects and the year fixed-effects respectively. The former controls for 
time-invariant individual characteristics whereas the latter captures common shocks affecting THs at the same 
time. εit is the error term, assumed to be iid. 
As positive serial correlation is detected in our data
4, the model 1 is estimated via first-differences rather than 
fixed-effect estimator. The first differences estimator is more efficient than the within one in the presence of 
serial correlation (Aker 2010; Wooldridge 2002). The estimated model is the following: 
∆ln	 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ δ∆￿￿￿ ￿ ∆￿￿ ￿ ∆￿￿￿  (2) 
Data for t=2000 are dropped as model is estimated in first differences and the panel contains now 8 years 
(2001-2008). Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at township level. 
 
Identification 
In order to obtain an unbiased and consistent estimator of the impact of the NRCMS based on equation (2), four 
                                                            
4 The Wooldridge test (2002), the Baltagi–Wu LBI statistic and the Bhargava et al. (1982) Durbin–Watson 
statistic were performed. All conclude that error terms are positively serially correlated. Results of tests are 
available upon request. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.37 
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major assumptions need to be verified: i) the parallel trend assumption (PTA), ii) the exogeneity of the order in 
which  the  reform  was  implemented,  iii)  a  “falsification  test”  to  test  potential  selection  on  unobservable 
characteristics, and iv) the absence of selective migration. 
 
The parallel trend hypothesis 
As the reform was not implemented in an experimental way, we need to check if there are no pre-existing 
differences between groups of THs implemented in varying years. The PTA states that the intrinsic evolution of 
the outcomes of THs should be independent of the NRCMS implementation. One conventional way to test the 
existence of the PTA is to compare the pre-intervention trends of dependent variables between groups which 
entered  the  reform  at  different  time  (Aker  2010;  Barham  2011;  Wagstaff  and  Moreno-Serra  2009).  The 
hypothesis is that the pre-intervention trends of the THs’ outcomes would be the same in the post-intervention 
period  if  the  NRCMS  has  not  been  introduced.  It  will  be  the  case  if,  other  things  being  equal,  the  pre-
intervention trends are not significantly different among the groups of THs with different entry dates into the 
NRCMS. Inspired by Barham (2011), the test of PTA is conducted with the following specification:  
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ∑ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿




￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿	￿￿￿    (3) 
Where t=2001-2002 (pre-intervention period, the reference period, year 2000, is dropped), k=2004-2006 
(period after the first intervention in 2003) and NRCMSk equal to one if the TH enters the reform during year k, 0 
otherwise. dyeart are year dummies which capture the period specific effect of 2001 and 2002. θtk represents, at 
year t, the additional period effect held by the groups of THs which enter the NRCMS in year k. If θtk are not 
significantly different from zero, the PTA is assumed and pre-intervention trends can be considered similar 
between  THs  that  applied  the  reform  in  varying  years.  Groups  of  THs  are  comparable  and  so  a  group  of 
comparison which consists of THs not yet treated makes a relevant counterfactual for groups of THs treated.  
Results are summarized in Table 2. For all dependent variables considered, the test supports the assumption that 




The exogeneity of the reform 
The DD approach requires that the assignment of the reform is exogenous across space and over time. The 
NRCMS is a national policy which is expected to be adopted in all rural areas in China. Therefore the potential CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.37 
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endogeneity  comes  rather  from  the  date  in  which  townships  enter  into  the  reform  rather  than  from  their 
eligibility. There are two sources of potential selection bias: the omitted variables and the reverse causality. 
Regarding the problem of omitted variables, the FD model controls for the time-invariant characteristics of 
THs and thus removes selection bias due to time-invariant variables (Ravallion 2007). However, variables which 
vary over time and across THs may also have effects on both outcome variables and reform implementation. 
Characteristics of the township in which THs are located are variables which vary across THs and over years. 
For example, the average income of rural households can be correlated with the medical activities of THs, or 
with their financial structure, because it reflects the capacity of households to pay for health care services and 
also the living standard of the township. But it can also be correlated with the interest variable, Pit, because 
poorer townships can  have implemented the reform in first and the richer ones in last for example, as the 
NRCMS aims to increase healthcare access for the poor. This problem can be solved by adding control variables 
to the regression, to avoid the artificial relationship caused by omitted variables (Aker 2010; Imbens 2004). 
Model 2 is then augmented: 
∆ln	 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ δ∆￿￿￿ ￿ '∆(￿￿ ￿ ∆￿￿ ￿ ∆￿￿￿  (4) 
The list of control variables  can be identified by comparing over the pre-reform period the  means of a 
comprehensive list of townships’ and THs’ characteristics between the group which implemented the reform in 
2003 (the first year of implementation) and the groups which entered the insurance reform later on (Aker 2010). 
According to the strategy of Aker (2010), based on the work of Imbens and Wooldridge (Unpublished), when 
covariates have a normalized difference in mean higher than 0.25 (in absolute value), they are considered to be 
significantly different and thus will be entered into the model (Imbens and Wooldridge, Unpublished; Aker 
2010). According to Table 3, seven covariates are to be included. At township level, the surface, the number of 
households, the number of village health stations and the rural net income per capita. At TH level, the number of 




Reverse causality refers to the situation where the outcome of the THs influence the order in which the 
NRCMS is implemented in the corresponding townships. Hospitals with more activities, for example, may be 
better organized and thus have higher efficiency. Therefore at the initial stage of the reform, the authority may 
prefer to choose the areas where hospitals have better performance. As a consequence, areas where the hospitals CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.37 
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have more activities have a higher probability to be chosen first. It may also be the case that the variation in 
hospital outcomes influences the chance that the township should be chosen to implement the reform in first. If, 
for instance, the TH has encountered a rapid decrease in the number of patients in the years preceding the 
reform, the township may be more motivated to participate in the reform, hoping that it should bring in more 
patients. In these cases, the date of introduction of the reform is not independent from the outcomes of the 
hospital. 
To test the existence of reverse causality, two strategies are adopted. The first one is adapted to test on a pre-
reform period sample, whether the NRCMS implementation decision is correlated with the variation of outcome 
variables during the years preceding the reform. For each township, it consists of the data for the three years 
before the implementation of the NRCMS
5. The following specification is used to test the assumption (De Janvry 
et al. 2009; Gruber and Hanratty 1995): 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ )* ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ∑ +,￿￿￿￿-,,￿￿
,￿￿
,￿￿ ￿	￿￿￿   (5) 
Where: year-l,it takes the value 1 if at year t, the reform will be implemented in l years for township i, and 0 
otherwise, l = 1, 2 or 3 (year-3, it is dropped because it is the reference period). County and year fixed effects are 
included, noted as wj and vt respectively (county fixed effects rather than township ones are included into the 
model due to the small  sample size of the  sample). κl are the coefficients of interest. If κl are statistically 
significant, it suggests that the entrance dates of THs are subject to the changes in the outcomes during the three 
years before the implementation of the NRCMS. The results are presented in Table 4. None of the coefficients is 
significant, which implies that the date of NRCMS placement is not driven by the changes in the outcome trends 




Secondly, reverse causality is checked with the test proposed by Gruber and Hanratty (1995) which is also 
applied in the study of Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra (2009). It is tested by adding to the model a dummy variable 
reflecting the implementation of the reform in the next year (Pit+1):  
￿ ￿￿ ￿ / ￿ 0￿￿	￿ ￿ δ′￿￿￿1￿ ￿ '(￿￿ ￿	￿￿ ￿ ￿*￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  (6) 
                                                            
5 As the dataset begins in 2000 and the reform begins in 2003, for townships that first implemented NRCMS in 
2003, the information on the period before the implementation of reform is available for maximum three years. 
In order to keep the same quantity of information for all the townships whatever their entry dates into the reform, 
we choose the three years before the implementation to construct pre-reform dataset. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.37 
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There is no problem of reverse causality when the coefficient on Pit+1, noted δ’ is not statistically significant. 
In  any  regressions,  the  coefficient  on  the  added  variable  (participation  in  the  next  year)  is  not  significant 
(P_value on tested variable is not listed here, results are available upon request). 
Falsification test 
A falsification test is performed to verify if there are no unobservable variables that could biased the estimated 
impact,  a  way  to  indirectly  test  the  “unconfoundedness  assumption”  (Imbens  and  Wooldridge  2009).  The 
dependant variable is lagged three years in order to estimate the impact of the NRCMS on a dependant variable 
which is supposed to be not affected by the reform. The outcomes during the pre-reform period should not be 
affected by the NRCMS as they are determined prior its implementation. The impact estimated by models 1 and 





The potential problem of selective migration comes from the phasing-in of the reform (Galiani et al. 2008). 
Residents in townships which are not yet covered by the NRCMS may want to migrate into townships that are 
covered to benefit from the system. It will bias the results if the immigrates’ characteristics are significantly 
different from that of the local population. The literature on Chinese inter-regional migration examining the 
motivation of migration shows reasons for migration may be economical, such as better job or higher income 
(Qiu  et  al.  2011;  Willmore  et  al.  2011);  or  non-economical,  such  as  marriage  (Fan  and  Huang  1998).  No 
evidence that people will migrate to benefit from the NRMCS advantages is underlined. Two supplementary 
reasons make us believe there is no bias due to migration. First, the NRCMS was extended to all the townships 
in a relatively short time (four years from 2003 to 2006), second the residence status is generally linked with the 
birth place, and people should not be treated outside their residence site until 2008. It is costly to change the 
living place, even if it is possible. Knowing that all townships would apply the NRCMS in a near future, the 
probability to migrate to benefit from the NRCMS may be low.     
 




Global impact of the NRCMS 
Table 6 presents the results. The introduction of the NRCMS has a mitigated impact on the estimated outcomes. 
Estimations show the NRCMS has no significant impact on the volume of outpatient visits and on the financial 
structure of THs, but a significant and positive impact on the number of discharged patients and on the bed 
occupancy  ratio.  As  compared  with  the  situation  without  the  NRCMS,  the  number  of  discharged  patients 
increases by 57%
6 and that of the bed occupancy ratio by 7.5% at TH level, reflecting an increase of the 
utilization of inpatient medical services. 
The  significance  is  robust  and  the  coefficients  are  stable  when  covariates  are  added  in  the  estimations, 
reflecting that the covariates introduced don’t influence both the schedule of the implementation of the NRCMS 




Heterogeneity of the impact 
We investigate here potential heterogeneous impacts of the reform across space and over time. Results are in 
Table 7. 
The participation dummy is replaced here by the share of the population covered by the NRCMS in the 
township in order to capture the intensity of the reform (Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra 2009). The results show 
that  utilization  of  THs  increases  alongside  the  development  of  the  NRCMS.  When  the  NCRMS  coverage 
enlarges by one percentage point in the township, the volume of outpatients, that of inpatients and the bed 
occupancy ratio increased, respectively by 2%, 5% and 7%. Compared to above results with the participation 
variable,  the  “intensity”  of  the  NRCMS,  measured  by  the  coverage  rate,  has  an  impact  on  the  volume  of 
outpatients while having joint or not the NRCMS have no effect. But, the impact of the NCRMS is smaller for 
the outpatient visits than for the volume of inpatients. As previously, there is still no effect of the reform on the 
financial structure of the THs.    
The new insurance system may impose different incentives for medical consultation on the population with 
                                                            
6 Participation is a dummy variable so the elasticity is calculated by the following formula: [e
(coefficient)-1]*100. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.37 
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different  socio-economic  characteristics.  It  can  be  expected  that  the  price  effect  of  insurance  on  healthcare 
demand will be less important for people in rich townships than people in poor ones. In order to check these, a 
dummy  variable “poor”
7 is interacted  with the participation dummy Pijt to capture differentiated impacts of 
insurance across space and socio-economic conditions. The “poor” dummy alone is not included to the model 
since it is highly correlated with the income variable. According to Table 7, the reform shows higher impacts on 
the volume of discharged patients in poor townships than in rich ones. In contrast, the interactive variable is 
significant and positive in the bed occupancy ratio regression whereas the participation dummy is not. This 
indicates the reform has a positive impact on the bed occupancy ratio only for THs located in poor townships. By 
contrast, the NRCMS shows neither significant average impact, nor significant heterogeneous impact on the 
volume of outpatient visits and on the share of drug income of THs. 
 There  are  two  types  of  THs:  general  and  central.  Theoretically,  their  missions  and  responsibilities  are 
complementary. Central THs are better equipped to treat hospitalizations than general THs. The former also 
brings technical support to the latter. In practice, according to our Chinese partners, this distinction is not so 
much  clear.  Central  and  general  THs  compete  for  patients.  By  interacting  the  participation  variable  with  a 
dummy reflecting the hospital level (1 for central THs, and 0 otherwise, i.e. for general THs), it is possible to 
check whether there is a differentiated impact of the NRCMS as regard to the status of the TH. The results show 
no evidence of such heterogeneous impact of the reform between general and central THs and significance of the 
participation dummy confirm previous results listed in Table 6. 
We may expect a differential effect of the NRCMS over the time. Experience with NRCMS may modify its 
impact. It is therefore expected that in the townships which implemented the insurance earlier than the others, the 
insurance has more influence on local agents’ behaviors. Inspired by Gruber and Hanratty (1995) and Galiani et 
al.  (2008),  this  paper  investigates  experience  effect  in  two  ways.  The  cumulative  effects  of  the  reform  are 
captured by the introduction of two dummies: “1 year after the reform”, “2 years or more after the reform”
8. 
Then, a discrete variable from 0 to 5 reflects the number of years of coverage by the insurance system: 0 for the 
year in which the NRCMS is implemented, 1 when the NRCMS has been implemented for one year, 2 when the 
NRCMS has been implemented for two years, etc. It assumes that there is a linear trend in the impact of the 
NRCMS.    Results  show  that  the  impact  of  the  NRCMS  on  the  volume  of  discharged  patients,  on  the  bed 
                                                            
7 Poor is calculated according to the rural net income per capita of the township. A township is considered as 
poor when it belongs to the quintile 1 (townships belonging to the 20% of the poorest townships). 
8 “1 year after the reform” equals to 1 if the township has been in the program for one year, 0 otherwise; “2 years 
or more after the reform” equals to 1 if reform has been implemented in the township for two years or more, 0 
otherwise. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.37 
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occupancy  ratio  and  on  the  share  of  drug  income,  decreases  over  time.  The  volume  of  outpatient  visits, 
discharged patients and the bed occupancy ratio continue to increase over time, but at a lower rate of growth: the 




Discussion and Conclusion 
In 2003, the Chinese government began the gradual implementation of the NRCMS, a community-based health 
insurance system for the rural population. One of the main objectives of the reform is to increase the use of the 
THs. Thus, this analysis aims to assess the impact of the introduction of the NRCMS on THs in Weifang 
Prefecture. Based on a randomly  selected THs sample observed over a nine-year period, the impact of the 
NRCMS is estimated with the first-differencing method, after having checked all the assumptions for estimated 
average treatment effects in a model with staggered entries. The study focuses on two dimensions supposed to be 
affected by the reform: the volume of medical activity delivered by THs (medical consultations, inpatient cares 
and bed occupancy rate) and the financial structure of THs in order to assess if the weight of the sales of 
medicines lowers with the reform. Some of the main preoccupations of the team of the Weifang Health Bureau 
were to reduce health costs that began to raise vertiginous levels and fight drug overprescribing. The sale of 
medicines is more profitable for hospitals than the delivery of medical services which are not associated with 
high-tech diagnosis. Therefore, hospitals tend to over-prescribe drugs (Hu et al. 2008; Liu and Mills 1999). So, 
great efforts to control drugs and service prices have been done through the insurance scheme and the set of a 
reimbursement ceiling. That measure would affect the financial structure of THs by inciting them to reduce the 
prescription of non-essential drugs. 
Estimations show that the reform of the insurance had an impact on the utilization of the TH. The volume 
of medical activities increases with the introduction of the NRCMS. The insurance reform did not have the same 
impact depending on the kind of activities. While, we observed a significant impact on the volume of inpatients 
care (i.e. discharged patients), no clear effect was found on the number of outpatient visits. These results for 
Weifang are consistent with those presented in the literature about the impact of the introduction of health 
insurance in studies concerning other Chinese regions (Barbiaz et al. 2010; Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra 2009; 
Wagstaff et al. 2009a; You and Kobayashi 2009).  And they fit with our expectations because the primary 
objective of the reform is to alleviate hospitalization costs borne by patients. The decline of hospitalization costs CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.37 
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is a way to promote the use of these services, leading to the rise of the volume of hospitalizations, and of bed 
occupancy ratio. Moreover, THs compete with village health stations for the delivery of outpatient services. The 
absence of clear impact of the NRCMS on the volume of outpatients at TH level may be explained by the fact 
that the reform increases consultations at village health stations for basic medical visits (Wagstaff et al. 2009a 
and our data for Weifang), allowing by this way to reinforce the true functions of THs in their referral position. 
However the reform of the insurance has no significant impact on the structure of THs’ financial resources. 
Despite – and because of - the increase of the activity, the sale of drugs continues to be the primary source of 
THs business income. As long as the profit margin of the sale of drugs is higher than that of the sale of medical 
services, the increase in the sale of services would (more than) proportionately increase the sale of drugs and 
providers still have incentives to overprescribe drugs. The new drug policy reform in Weifang, introduced in 
2011 and almost cutting off the profit of drugs prescribing by TH, could have changed drastically this pattern. 
A third discussion point is that the insurance impact is heterogeneous across space and over time, especially 
for the inpatients care. We saw that, after the implementation of the NRCMS, the volume of discharged patients 
increases more in poor townships than in rich townships. Such results are not surprising as income is often the 
main obstacle to hospitalization (WHO 2010), and the price elasticity of demand is higher for poor households.  
As insurance scheme gives similar financial support to all the insured, it represents a more important proportion 
of capacity to pay for the poor than for non-poor. Nevertheless, we can’t infer from this point that catastrophic 
health care expenditures have been drastically reduced.  The literature analyzing the impact of the NRCMS on 
catastrophic expenditures finds no clear evidence of such effects (Sun et al. 2009; Wagstaff and Lindelow 2008; 
Wagstaff et al. 2009a). Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008) found that in Gansu province medical insurance had led 
households to search for more specialized and costly care. As a result, they detected an increase in catastrophic 
expenditures. In the same way, Sun et al. (2009) stresses that the effects of the NRCMS on the financial burden 
of rural households is limited. 
The influence of the NRCMS also evolves over time because of the extension of the coverage rates and of the 
accumulated experience. The marginal effect decreases. A longer period is necessary to assess the long term 
impact of the reform.  A kind of  “∩” curve  for medical activities could be observed in the coming  years, 
although unlikely, if the quality of care does not improve or if it deteriorates due to supply-side moral hazard. 
The development of the NRCMS was rapid and allows the increase of the utilization of medical services at 
TH level. The scheme covers the vast majority of the rural population and incentives need to be concentrated on 
the characteristics of the benefit package and the reimbursement modalities in order to avoid the decreasing CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.37 
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effect in attending THs in medium and long term. Furthermore, beside the NRCMS, the improvement of the 
utilization, quality and efficiency of THs should be reinforced by supply-side incentives such as reform of the 
provider payment mechanism. An important step would be that stakeholders shift the NRCMS from passive 
payers to active purchasing agents. 
Our findings show that the demand for healthcare at THs has increased thanks to the reform. But we don’t 
know to what extend it leads to a net increase of demand, or if a share of this demand is stemming from a 
transfer of demand from the upper level hospitals (county hospitals), as NCMS increase the gap between the cost 
of care at THs and county hospitals, more expensive. 
As far as the limitations of this study, one could consider that our results lie on a relatively small THs’ 
sample.  But, as we mentioned it previously, our findings are representative of THs in the Weifang Prefecture 
(about 14% of all the THs)as we used randomized process of selection of the hospitals, and as they are from  a 
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County  Township  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Anqui (2003) 
Jin Zhongzi          X  X 
Guan Gong Zhen        X  X  X 
Jingshi        X  X  X 
Lin Wu        X  X  X 
Wu Shan Zhen        X  X  X 
Xin An        X  X  X 
Zhe Shan Zhen        X  X  X 
Changyi 
(2004) 
Liu Tan          X  X 
Xia Dian Zhen        X  X  X 
Gaomi (2005) 
Cai Gou Zhen        X  X  X 
Da Mou Jia Zhen      X  X  X  X 
Jing Gou Zhen      X  X  X  X 
Kan Jia Zhen      X  X  X  X 
Qinzhou 
(2003) 
Dong Xia Zhen  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Gao Liu Zhen        X  X  X 
He Guan Zhen        X  X  X 
Shao Zhuang Zhen      X  X  X  X 
Tan Fang Zhen      X  X  X  X 
Wang Fen Zhen      X  X  X  X 
Shouguang 
(2004) 
Dao Tian Zhen    X  X  X  X  X 
Hou Zhen    X  X  X  X  X 
Tian Liu Zhen        X  X  X 
Zhucheng 
(2004) 
Bai Chi He      X  X  X  X 
Ma Zhuang Zhen        X  X  X 
The entry date of county into the reform is in the parentheses.  In our sample, not all townships entered the reform at the same 
date  that  the  county  which  they  belong  to.  Before  2003,  none counties  or  townships  were  involved  into  the  NRCMS. 
Compartments colored in light grey when a township is covered by the NRCMS. The cross designates that there are at least 
90% of the township population who is insured by the NRCMS. 
 
Figure 1 Phasing-in of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.37 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Total sample 
(2000 – 2008)  YEAR 2000  YEAR 2003  YEAR 2006  YEAR 2008 
Variables
a  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Characteristics of the THs’ environment 
# of households (10,000)  1.36  0.68  1.09  0.54  1.26  0.61  1.30  0.62  1.79  0.83 
Share of rural (%)  92.80  4.38  93.46  3.98  93.56  4.17  91.86  4.69  92.57  4.46 
Rural net income per capita  0.45  0.12  0.33  0.05  0.38  0.06  0.49  0.61  0.63  0.09 
Township hospitals’ characteristics 
# of beds  38.67  19.48  32.79  12.31  33.58  15.16  37.46  16.28  58.88  34.17 
# of professionals  38.95  28.80  34.78  23.69  36.25  26.56  38.54  29.00  52.12  40.39 




















# of discharged patients  1,271.42  892.17  958.87  642.79  912.29  712.21  1,476.21  820.24  2,184.00  1,077.56 
Bed  occupancy  ratio  (in 
days)  0.47  0.24  0.44  1.25  0.38  0.24  0.55  0.18  0.61  0.19 
Business income  202.48  195.4  133.28  99.72  129.34  99.81  209.85  171.93  418.69  311.31 
Medical treatment income  78.99  88.29  50.42  47.24  48.4  47.31  92.15  92.23  152.8  138.06 
Income from drug sales  123.49  112.18  82.85  56.77  80.94  56.28  117.79  83.53  265.88  181.39 
 
aAll  monetary  variables  are  in  10,000  RMB  and  normalized  to  2000  constant  prices  (Shandong  province  price  index,  Statistical  Yearbook  2009). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.37 
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Table 2 Test of the Parallel Trend Assumption 






Share of drug 
income 
  Township hospitals which implemented NRCMS in 2003 
2001  0.0445  0.0951  0.00961  -3.594 
  (0.0571)  (0.0632)  (0.0263)  (3.248) 
2002  -0.0310  0.0743  0.0510  -0.501 
  (0.0569)  (0.398)  (0.135)  (3.947) 
  Township hospitals which implemented NRCMS in 2004 
2001  -0.0391  -0.0493  0.000365  6.829 
  (0.0615)  (0.121)  (0.0301)  (4.419) 
2002  0.0883  -0.275  -0.101  2.292 
  (0.0972)  (0.459)  (0.172)  (5.241) 
  Township hospitals which implemented NRCMS in 2005 
2001  -0.00988  0.0398  0.0219  4.879 
  (0.0585)  (0.0991)  (0.0332)  (5.245) 
2002  0.00630  -0.00993  -0.0176  -0.563 
  (0.0891)  (0.404)  (0.137)  (4.899) 
  Township hospitals which implemented NRCMS in 2006 
2001  -0.00717  -0.0597  -0.0456  4.277 
  (0.102)  (0.183)  (0.0356)  (3.330) 
2002  -0.0145  -0.269  -0.104  3.579 
  (0.126)  (0.445)  (0.149)  (4.392) 
Standard  errors  (in  parentheses)  are  corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and  clustered  at  township  level.  ***  indicates 
significance at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%. Test is performed on a sample from 2000 to 2003, i.e. the pre-reform period. 
The model is estimated with THs fixed-effects.  
 





reform 2004  Normalized 
difference 
Year reform 
2005  Normalized 
difference 
Year 
reform 2006  Normalized 
difference 
  Mean  Sd.  Mean  Sd.  Mean  Sd.  Mean  Sd. 
Township characteristics 
Total land area 
(km²)  110.45  25.11  95.57  13.66  0.52  95.31  5.04  0.59  95.24  15.56  0.52 
# of households
b  1.07  0.11  1.31  0.16  1.23  1.05  0.10  0.15  1.25  0.30  0.55 
# of health 
stations  27.72  1.38  34.67  9.19  0.75  26.73  8.42  0.12  22.79  5.71  0.84 
Share of rural 
population (%)  93.27  1.21  93.83  1.28  0.32  93.76  2.31  0.19  93.24  1.81  0.01 
Rural net income 
per capita
a  0.31  0.02  0.37  0.02  2.06  0.32  0.00  0.80  0.35  0.02  1.44 
Township hospital characteristics 
# of beds  29.33  1.09  32.07  5.84  0.46  35.00  5.48  1.01  35.96  5.70  1.14 
# of staff  28.50  4.03  43.20  6.91  1.84  44.67  10.83  1.40  44.63  18.12  0.87 
Subsidies
a  5.82  1.59  30.45  10.67  2.28  14.37  1.41  4.03  13.90  4.23  1.79 
Sd. denotes standard deviations. They are clustered at TH level. Normalized differences are listed in absolute value and they 
are computed following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009): difference in mean between groups over the root square of the sum 
of variances of the two groups. 
aMonetary variables are in 10,000 RMB and normalized to 2000 constant prices (Shandong 
province price index, Statistical Yearbook 2009). 
bUnit: 10,000 households. 
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Table 4 Test of reverse causality 
  Ln (Outpatient visits)  Ln (Discharged 
patients)  Bed occupancy rate  Share of drug income 
Year 1 before  0.00114  0.0880  -0.0366  -2.634 
(0.0629)  (0.155)  (0.0493)  (1.989) 
Year 2 before  0.0620  0.0824  -0.0178  -2.836 
(0.0442)  (0.109)  (0.0362)  (1.487) 
Standard  errors  (in  parentheses)  are  corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and  clustered  at  township  level.  ***  indicates 
significance at 1% and ** at 5%. The five specifications are estimated on a sample consisted of the three years preceding the 





Table 5 Reverse causality and falsification tests 
  Pit+1  Participation 
Ln (Outpatient visits)  0.02164  0.00983 
  (0.0729)  (0.0549) 
Ln (Discharged patients)  0.56397  0.0231 
  (0.1732)  (0.148) 
Bed occupancy rate  0.00358  0.00752 
  (0.0594)  (0.0468) 
Share of drug income  1.46226  -0.561 
  (1.6277)  (2.213) 
Standard  errors  (in  parentheses)  are  corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and  clustered  at  township  level.  ***  indicates 
significance at 1% and ** at 5%. The model is estimated with THs fixed-effects and year fixed-effects. The results of the 





Table 6 Impact of the NRCMS in first-difference 
  Ln (Outpatient visits)  Ln (Discharged patients)  Bed occupancy rate  Share of drug income 
Participation  0.151  0.149  0.478**  0.454**  0.0841***  0.0754**  1.066  1.140 
  (0.0899)  (0.0932)  (0.172)  (0.171)  (0.0258)  (0.0270)  (1.547)  (1.556) 
Observations  192  192  192  192  192  192  192  192 
R-squared  0.192  0.234  0.191  0.228  0.154  0.211  0.104  0.140 
Covariates (Xit)  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes 
Standard  errors  (in  parentheses)  are  corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and  clustered  at  township  level.  ***  indicates 
significance at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%. The model 2 is estimated by OLS with year fixed-effects. 
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Table 7 Heterogeneous impact of the NRCMS 
Ln(Outpatient visits)  Ln(Inpatients)  Occupancy bed rate  Share drug income 
  Intensity of the NRCMS 
Coverage rate of the NRCMS  0.00203*  0.00529**  0.000685**  0.0157 
  (0.00115)  (0.00209)  -0.000316  -0.019 
  Level of development 
Participation  0.150  0.392**  0.0468  1.071 
  (0.0979)  (0.172)  (0.0280)  (1.553) 
P*Poor  -0.00580  0.302*  0.138***  0.333 
(1=poor, 0=non poor)  (0.142)  (0.170)  (0.0428)  (2.525) 
  Status of the TH 
Participation  0.208  0.382**  0.0983***  -0.237 
  (0.125)  (0.161)  (0.0341)  (1.877) 
P*hospital level  -0.159  0.191  -0.0607  3.661 
(1=central, 0=general)  -0.143  -0.381  -0.0479  -2.491 
  Experience effects 
1 year after NRCMS  -0.0352  -0.143**  0.0174  1.884 
  (0.0617)  (0.0572)  (0.0303)  (1.704) 
2  years or more after NRCMS  -0.166  -0.515***  -0.102**  4.626** 
  (0.0985)  (0.104)  (0.0425)  (2.047) 
# of years after NRCMS  -0.127**  -0.278***  -0.0523**  -0.494 
  (0.0541)  (0.0985)  (0.0231)  (1.320) 
Standard  errors  (in  parentheses)  are  corrected  for  heteroskedasticity  and  clustered  at  township  level.  ***  indicates 
significance at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%. The model is estimated by OLS with year fixed-effects and covariates are 
included. 
 
 